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Abstract
Promising emerging equity markets often witness investment herds and frenzies, accom-
panied by an abundance of media coverage. Complementarity in information acquisition can
explain these anomalies. Because information has a high fixed cost of production, its equilib-
rium price is low when quantity is high. Investors all buy the most popular information because
it has the lowest price. Given two identical asset markets, investors herd: asset demand is
higher in the market with abundant information because information reduces risk. By lowering
risk, information raises the asset’s price. Transitions between low-information/low-asset-price
and high-information/high-asset-price equilibria raise price volatility and create price paths re-
sembling periodic frenzies. Using equity data and a new panel data set of news counts for 23
emerging markets, the results show that when asset market volatility increases, news coverage
intensifies, and that more news is correlated with higher asset prices.
∗NYU Stern School of Business, Economics Department, 44 West 4th Street, 7th floor, New York, NY 10012.
email: lveldkam@nyu.edu. Thanks to Xavier Vives, Tim Van Zandt, Thomas Sargent, John Leahy, Boyan Jovanovic,
Andrew Rose, Bernard Dumas, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Joe Chen, Pascal Maenhout, Hyun Shin, Paul Pfleiderer,
Anat Admati, and seminar participants at NBER summer institute EF&G meeting, SED meetings, Texas, Wharton,
UCSD, Duke Fuqua, Maryland, NYU, Yale, Carnegie Mellon, Pittsburgh, Federal Reserve, Stockholm IIES, Toulouse,
Stanford, and INSEAD for helpful comments. Many thanks to Joe¨l Peress for use of software he developed that made
the news data collection possible, and to Yuan-Chuan Lien for excellent research assistance. JEL classification: D82,
G14, G12. Keywords: Crashes, herding, information market, media.
The search for the source of frenzies and herds is a search for complementarities in asset demand:
How can one person buying an asset make the asset more attractive to other investors? Perhaps
the complementarities lie not in the demand for assets, but in the demand for information used to
price the asset.
Why look to information markets as the source of frenzies and herds, rather than to asset
markets themselves? The reason lies in the non-rival nature of information. Because assets are in
fixed supply, an increase in demand must raise the market price, in order for the market to clear.
This is not the case for information. An increase in demand for a particular piece of information in
a competitive market causes more information to be provided at a lower price. This is the source
of the complementarity and the source of large fluctuations in information provision. Investors buy
the same information that others are buying because that information is inexpensive. By reducing
payoff uncertainty, abundant information raises an asset’s price above other equally profitable
assets, creating excess price dispersion (herds). Occasionally, there are large shifts in information
demand as investors coordinate on a new asset to learn about. Such a shift in information and risk
creates large price movements and generates excess price volatility (frenzies).
The innovation in this model comes from an insight of growth theory. Romer (1990) points out
that information is fundamentally distinct from other goods because information has a fixed cost
of discovery and a near-zero cost of replication. This information production technology, coupled
with free entry in the information market, results in information prices that decline as demand
rises. This is consistent with observed pricing schemes. Consider the relative prices of one issue of
The New York Times, the Economist, Econometrica, and a consultant’s report on one firm. The
New York Times, the publication of most general interest, is the least expensive. As the audience
becomes more specialized, prices rise.
The basis for the model is a Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) economy, where agents decide whether to
purchase a signal about an asset’s payoff, and then choose their asset demand, given an equilibrium
price. In contrast to Grossman and Stiglitz, this model features a competitive information pro-
duction sector that supplies information at an endogenous price. The setting is similar to Admati
and Pfleiderer (1986), who incorporate a monopolistic information supplier. However, competitive
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information provision is crucial to generating information complementarity.
Information affects asset prices and asset markets generate demand for information. Agents
who purchase information observe a component of the risky asset payoff. Information reduces
the asset’s conditional variance. This conditional variance captures uncertainty – an expected
distance between beliefs and the true state. In the equilibrium where information is cheap and
demand is high, decreased conditional variance raises the asset’s price. In the other equilibrium
where information is expensive and demand is zero, the asset is riskier and its price is lower.
Hence, information moves asset prices. Switches between information equilibria occur because of
changes in the asset payoff’s unconditional variance. This unconditional variance measures payoff
volatility. The model features a state process that ties unconditional variance to expected asset
payoffs. When unconditional variance is high, information about the payoff is valuable; a positive-
information equilibrium arises. With low volatility, a no-information equilibrium prevails. A media
frenzy is triggered when an asset payoff increase raises unconditional payoff variance. The added
unconditional variance prompts a switch to the positive-information equilibrium. Because it reduces
conditional variance, abundant information raises the asset’s price above what the improvement in
fundamentals would predict.
With multiple markets and an information transmission constraint, the model generates in-
vestment herds. Price complementarity makes all investors want to buy information in the same
market. With the information constraint, high demand for information in one market crowds out
information about another market. Since information raises expected asset prices by reducing
conditional variance, two markets with identical parameters and histories can have different asset
prices. One market will generate news and the news will raise its asset price; the other will not.
The predictions of the theory are supported by empirical evidence from emerging markets. A
new panel data set of Financial Times stories measures information, and data from S&P measures
equity prices. High news levels coincide with high payoff variance and high price levels. The data
also confirm the herding prediction that asset price dispersion across markets is high when news is
abundant.
Complementarity of information is an idea also present in models of short-term speculation.
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In Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1992), information serves as an equilibrium coordination device
among bubble equilibria. Similarly, Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) structure an asset market to make
information acquisition complementary when asset prices are low. Instead, with media frenzies,
information markets generate the complementarity.
Media-driven herds result in intense media coverage of booming markets. In contrast, theories
of herds (Welch 1992, Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et.al.1992, Chari and Kehoe 1999) posit that
frenzies arise because too little information is revealed. Data on information provision surrounding
asset price booms supports the media frenzy hypothesis. Shiller (2000) documents the increase in
press coverage of the stock market as it soared throughout the 1920’s. Once-obscure junk bonds
became big news in the ’80s as returns increased. Investors learned about East Asia and the
”miracle” as growth rates climbed to new heights.
1 A Model of Asset Demand and Information Provision
Preferences and Technology
A large finite number of two-period-lived, ex-ante identical agents have constant absolute risk
aversion preferences over wealth (Wt+1).1
U(Wt+1) = Et[−e−aWt+1 ] (1)
There are two assets: one risky asset with payoff ut+1, and one riskless asset with payoff r > 1.
The risky asset payoff has a persistent component θ and an idiosyncratic component ².
ut+1 = θt+1 + ²t+1
The persistent component of payoffs follows an AR(1) process with mean µ and proportional shocks
η.
θt+1 = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ ∗ θt(1 + ηt+1)
1This utility function is equivalent to a CARA utility function defined over consumption when agents have no
bequest motive. They consume all their wealth at the end of life.
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Innovations are i.i.d. ² ∼ N(0, σ2² ), η ∼ N(0, ση).
A multiplicative shock to payoffs is a natural assumption in this setting. The proportionality of
the mean and standard deviation is a feature of payoff processes shared by exponential processes
such as θt+1 = exp[(1 − ρ)µ + ρ ∗ θt + ηt+1]. Many papers employ such a process because it
delivers scale invariance. Two shares of an asset with expected payoff of $1 will have the same
payoff variance as one share with expected payoff of $2. Furthermore, the assumption that payoff
volatility is increasing in its level is supported in the data.2 That shocks are multiplicative is
important because information demand will depend on the variance of payoffs. This assumption
makes the variance of expected payoff innovations (σθt) change over time, and will cause information
demand to fluctuate.
Information
In each period t, agent i chooses whether to buy information or not. The information reveals the
persistent component of next period’s asset payoff (θt+1) at time t. The asset payoff ut+1 and the
state θt+1 are revealed publicly at the beginning of period t + 1. For any variable z, let zt be the
t-history {z0, . . . , zt}. Agents who purchase information at time t have a filtration
FIt = {θt+1, ut, ²t, P t}
and agents who do not purchase information have filtration
FUt = {θt, ut, ²t, P t}.
Asset Markets
The risky asset has price Pt; the riskless asset price is normalized to one. The per capita supply
of the risky asset xt is normally distributed: xt ∼ N(E[x], σ2x). This supply is never observed.
2In the emerging market equity data described in section 6, a regressing time-t dividend volatility (as measured
by squared changes) on the (t-1) dividend level yields a positive coefficient, significant at the 99% confidence level
(t-stat = 4.05). Doing the same exercise with payoffs (next-period price plus dividends) yields a positive coefficient
with a t-statistic of 16.9.
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However, agents who know θt+1 can infer the value of xt from the price. The role of the supply
shocks is to prevent price from perfectly revealing θt+1 to uninformed agents.
Information Markets
The mechanism that generates herds and frenzies is price complementarity in information demand;
information prices decline as demand rises. Because information is non-rival, this pricing relation-
ship arises naturally from a number of competitive market structures. This section describes three
such markets. To show that results are not dependent on market structure details, all propositions
are proven for each market.
The three markets have the following common features. First, information is produced according
to a fixed-cost technology. θt+1 can be discovered at the beginning of period t at a per-capita fixed
cost χ. This can be interpreted as the cost of hiring a journalist to interview people and find
primary sources of information. The information, once discovered, can be distributed to other
traders at zero marginal cost. Second, reselling purchased information is forbidden. The realistic
counterpart to this assumption is intellectual property law that prohibits copying a publication and
re-distributing it for profit. Third, there is free entry. Any agent can discover information at any
time.
That information markets are competitive is crucial. The exact market structure is not. All
three markets produce information prices that decrease in demand, complementarity in information
acquisition, and frenzies. The most tractable market is price competition. This is the market
structure that is used for numerical analysis in section 4. However, the perfectly competitive
outcome in this market is fragile. A small sunk cost would deter new entry. Free from threats
of competition, the producer could price as a monopolist (Vives 1999). Because a monopolist’s
price does not decrease in demand, complementarity in information would disappear. The Cournot
model yields a price that can only be expressed as an implicit function, but has a less fragile
equilibrium. The monopolistic competition model with its variety of information types is the most
common setting used to analyze information supply (e.g. Shapiro and Varian 1998).
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Market I: Price Competition in a Perfectly Contestable Market Profits from information
discovery depend on the price charged and demand for information, given the pricing strategies
of other agents. The market is perfectly contestable.3 Let dit = 1 if agent i decides to discover
information in period t and dit = 0 otherwise. Let per capita demand for information with price
cit, given all other posted prices c−it, be I(·, ·). Then the objective of the information producer is
to maximize profit.
max
dit,cit
dit(citI(cit, c−it)− χ) (2)
Market II: Cournot Competition Profits from producing information depend on the quantity
of information production chosen, as well as the quantities chosen by all other producers. Let the
price for information when agent i produces d˜it copies of news, per capita, and all other agents
produce a per capita quantity d˜−it, be c˜(·, ·). The objective of the information producer is to
maximize profit.
max
d˜it
d˜itc˜(d˜it, d˜−it)− χ1d˜it>0 (3)
Market III: Monopolistic Competition with Versions of Information Agent i has pref-
erences over wealth and the type of news she receives, j.
U(Wt+1, j) = −e−a(Wt+1−ψij) (4)
Each news type has the same fixed cost of production χ, and contains the same information θt+1.
All types convey the same facts about an event. However buyers may have different costs of
acquisition, or different opportunity costs for the time spent processing the information, depending
on the medium or reporting style.4 If the consumer does not buy news, then j = 0 and ψij = 0.
Each consumer buys at most one type of news and only one unit of that type. There is a large,
3One way to ensure that the market is contestable is to force agents to choose prices in a first stage and choose
entry in a second stage. This is a reasonable way to think of news markets where the price of the periodical is fixed
well in advance and then editors decide whether or not to supply a story. By supplying the story, they would be
entering the market for that piece of information.
4Preferences over news types take the form of individual-specific costs. This assumption allows a convenient
nesting of price-setting and Cournot models inside this setup. The qualitative results are the same for additive
preferences over news types.
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finite number K of news types. Consumer i’s preferences over type j are independent across types
and consumers and are distributed uniformly: ψij ∼ unif[0, b].
The information demand function is the same as the pure price-competition model except that
demand is a function of the producer’s information type j, as well as the set of all types produced
J . Agents decide whether to produce information dit²{0, 1}, choose a type j and charge a price cit
to maximize their expected profit.
max
dit,j,cit
dit(citI(cit, j, c−it, J)− χ). (5)
Order of Events
1. All agents enter the first period of life knowing the persistent component of the period t asset
payoff θt and σθt, the variance of θt+1, conditional on θt.
• Agents decide whether to discover information, what type to discover, and what price
or quantity to set.
• Agents choose whether or not to purchase information. Informed agents observe θt+1.
• Informed and uninformed agents demand DI and DU units of the risky asset.
2. Payoffs are received. The asset supply xt and the asset payoff ut+1, with its persistent and
transitory components θt+1, and ²t+1 are revealed.
3. In the second period of life, agents derive utility from terminal wealth Wt+1.
Equilibrium
Given an initial wealth, a persistent asset payoff process, payoff shocks, and risky asset supply,
{θt, ²t, xt}∞t=1, an equilibrium is a sequence of risky asset demands and a fraction of investors who
purchase information {Dit, λt}∞t=1, and asset prices, information prices {Pt, ct}∞t=1, such that in
every period t > 0
1. Given prices {Pt, ct}, agents choose whether to buy information of type j (Iijt = 1), or not
(Iijt = 0), and choose asset demands to maximize expected utility (1), or (4) for monopolistic
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competition, subject to their budget constraint,5
Wt+1 = (Wt − PtDit − Iitcjt)r +Ditut+1 + piit.
λt is the fraction of agents who buy information.
2. Information supply and pricing strategies are a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. They
solve (2), (3), or (5), depending on the information market structure.
3. The markets for risky assets and information clear.
2 Complementarity, Equilibrium Transitions and Asset Prices
This section derives properties of equilibrium information provision and describes the interaction
between information and asset prices. All three information markets produce information prices
that decline as demand rises (proposition 1). This price complementarity makes investors want
to coordinate their information purchases (proposition 2). The equilibrium prescribes either no
information or a large amount of information provision. What moves the economy between high
and low information equilibria is fluctuations in asset payoff volatility σθt (propositions 3 and 4).
The model ties volatility to the expected payoff of the asset θt, and in turn, to the asset price.
When the expected payoff is high, the price, the volatility, and the information demand are high
as well. The economy is in a positive information equilibrium. Because information decreases the
conditional variance of the asset payoff, it increases the price (proposition 5). When expected payoff
and price are low, the economy is in the no-information equilibrium. In these periods, the price
in this model is identical to the price in a model with no information markets. Thus, information
increases unconditional price variance by further increasing prices during times when prices are
already at their highest levels.
Proposition 1 Information Price Declines in Quantity
5Because of constant absolute risk aversion preferences, end-of-period information revelation, and the Markov
state process, maximizing next period utility would also be optimal for an infinitely-lived agent.
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All three market structures produce an equilibrium price for information c(λ), that is a decreasing
function of the quantity of information purchased, λ.
All proofs are in the appendix. This result follows from the free entry assumption. As in-
formation demand rises, producers must produce more and reduce prices to deter new entrants.
The result is more surplus for information purchasers. The price competition and competitive
monopolist models yield average cost pricing. Because of the fixed cost in information production,
average cost declines as the number of information purchasers rises. In the Cournot market, when
information demand rises, the producer must raise quantity to deter new market entrants. This
results in a lower price.
A price that falls as demand rises produces price complementarity. An information purchase by
one agent has two opposing effects on other agents’ information demand. An increase in information
demand makes information cheaper and therefore more desirable to uninformed agents. However,
increased information provision makes the asset price more informative, decreasing the value of
information. Let the net benefit to the purchaser of the λNth signal be denoted by B(λ; θt).
Grossman and Stiglitz show that the expected net benefit of information is
B(λ) =
[
var(ut+1|Pt)
var(ut+1|θt+1)
]1/2
− ea(c(λt)+ψ˜) (6)
where ψ˜ is the lowest cost news type for the marginal buyer of news.6 The first term is the
benefit of information (plus one). When the variance of payoffs given the price (var[ut+1|Pt]) is
greater than the payoff variance given information (var[ut+1|θt+1]), then information provides some
benefit. The second term is the utility cost of information (plus one). The difference between the
information purchasing decision in this model and in Grossman and Stiglitz is the endogenous price
of information c(λt), rather than a constant information price c.
Proposition 2 Information Complementarity
At every θt, the expected net benefit of purchasing information B(λ; θt) is increasing in the fraction
of agents that are informed λ, over some range λ ² [0, λ?t ).
6In the price competition or Cournot models, ψ˜ = 0.
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The fall in the net benefit of information as the number of informed agents rises is the effect
identified by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). When more agents act knowing θt+1, the price level is
more informative. When the price reveals more information, purchasing that information becomes
less attractive. In Grossman and Stiglitz, the net benefit curve is monotonically decreasing and
there can be only one equilibrium. When the information price in endogenous, the net benefit
curve has an increasing part. Price complementarity is the force that makes the net benefit of
information rise in the number of informed investors. The non-monotonic net benefit function is
responsible for the discrete changes in information regimes.
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Figure 1: Expected net benefit of information, as the aggregate demand for information varies.
Equilibrium Transitions
In equilibrium, information demand λe is such that all purchasers of information weakly prefer to
have information, and no additional agents want to purchase B(λe; θt) = 0 – points A, B and C
in figure 1.7 If no one purchases information, the first person to buy must incur the entire fixed
cost of information production. A high information fixed cost ensures that no information is an
equilibrium. With a large number of agents, even a near-zero per-capita fixed cost causes the cost
of buying the first signal to outweigh its benefit. When many people purchase information, the
cost of discovery is shared, information is cheap and signals are a more attractive purchase.
7The parameter values used to generate the graph are: σθ = 0.1, σ² = 0.1, σ
2
x = 10, a = 0.7, χ = 1.8, n = 50.
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Although A, B and C could all be equilibria for information demand, only B is also an equi-
librium in information supply. The reason is that the market in figure 1 can support a large
information supply. An agent in a state where no other agents are producing information (A) or
where production is very limited (C) can make a profit by discovering information and either selling
it at a lower price, or increasing the quantity supplied.
Proposition 3 Information Equilibrium Transition Rule
For a given set of positive, finite-valued parameters, ση, σ², σx, a, χ, {ψi}, there exists a cutoff θ?,
such that for all θt ≥ θ?, λet > 0 and for all θt ≤ θ?, λet = 0, in equilibrium.
What causes the net benefit of information for a given demand λ to fluctuate, is changes in the
volatility of the asset payoff. When volatility is high, information that reveals the level of θt+1 is
more valuable. Recall that the variance vart[θt+1] = ρ2θ2t σ
2
η is increasing in the level of asset payoff
θt.8 Therefore, increases in θt shift the net benefit curve up. When θt is very low, the entire net
benefit curve may lie below zero. These are times when no positive information equilibrium exists.
The cutoff payoff level θ? makes the peak of the net benefit curve lie at zero.
The reason that the expected level of payoffs should increase information demand is that a piece
of information that tells you if you will gain or lose 50% on an investment that is worth $10 is not
as valuable as information on whether you will gain or lose 50% on an investment worth $100. All
else equal, we want to know more about higher-value markets because they have more value at risk.
Information and Asset Prices
This section derives two predictions of the model that relate information to asset prices. These
predictions are tested with asset price and news data in section 6. The first prediction is that an
increase in asset payoff volatility causes an increase in information provision. The second is that
the expected asset price increases with more information provision.
Proposition 4 Payoff Volatility Increases Information
8Large, negative asset payoffs could also generate information demand in equilibrium. However, this is a rare
occurrence because the mean of θ is above zero.
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The fraction of informed investors λt is a non-decreasing function of the variance of persistent
payoff innovations σ2θt.
The dependence of information on payoff variance has two components: risk and information’s
increasing returns. Risk, measured as the expected squared percentage change in payoffs, increases
information demand because information that predicts payoffs is most valuable when large payoff
changes are likely. The mean of payoffs matters because the benefit of information increases in
the value of the asset. Assets with a higher expected payoff comprise a larger share of the average
investor’s portfolio. Information about an x% change in an asset that is 50% of a portfolio is more
valuable than the same information about an asset worth 5% of the portfolio. The total variance
is the risk of the asset, interacted with the value of the asset at risk.
Proposition 5 Information Increases Asset Price
The expected price of the risky asset E[Pt|θt, λt] is strictly increasing in the amount of information
provision λt.
Changes in information equilibria move the asset price by changing the variance of the asset’s
payoffs. Grossman and Stiglitz show that an expected utility maximizing agent i with information
F it who observes equilibrium asset price Pt, demands D(F it , Pt) units of the risky asset.
D(F it , Pt) =
E[ut+1|F it , Pt]− rPt
aVar[ut+1|F it , Pt]
The unique market clearing price Pλ(θt+1, xt) for a given information demand λt equates total
demand for the risky asset with supply.
λtD(FI , Pt) + (1− λt)D(FU , Pt) = xt
When more information is provided to the market, the conditional risk of the asset payoff,
Var[ut+1|F it , Pt], is lower. Lower risk makes the asset more attractive to investors, increases demand
and raises the price. Information raises the conditional expectation of the price. However, realized
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prices can be lower with information, if the information predicts low asset payoffs (if E[ut+1|F it , Pt]
is low).
Two features of positive information equilibria produce large asset price volatility. First,
switches between positive-information and no-information equilibria create abrupt changes in infor-
mation demand. These sudden changes in information levels cause large jumps in the price level:
Large decreases in payoff uncertainty increase the price. Second, positive information equilibria
exist when θt is high. A high θt means a high expected asset payoff, and a high asset price. Hence,
positive information equilibria exist and raise prices when prices are already high. By making the
most extreme price realizations more extreme, small information effects can have large consequences
for the variance of prices. The extent of this excess price volatility is assessed in the numerical
example.
3 Bringing the Model to Data
Data
To assess the magnitude of the model’s frenzies and test the model’s predictions requires data on
equity markets and financial news. The data is a panel consisting of weekly observations of a price
index, total return index and the number of news stories pertaining to 23 emerging markets between
1989 and 2002. (12,217 observations) Table 8 contains descriptive statistics for the news and price
data.
The price and return indices are from the S&P/IFCI Emerging Markets Database. The price
index measures a country’s market capitalization and the total return index measures market
capitalization plus cash dividends. Since the model’s assets are two-period-lived, the total return
index (price plus dividends) of an infinitely-lived asset is the equivalent of the payoff of the model
assets. Weekly observations are the Friday level of the index. All countries get an index of 100 at the
time they enter the sample. Therefore, only index comparisons within a country are meaningful. For
calibration, I use percentage deviations of price from country mean. Since the dividends extracted
from these series are highly cyclical, dividend data are 6-month backwards-looking moving averages.
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I collect news stories from the Financial Times that contain the name of the country or the
adjective form of that name, in the title or lead paragraph. The reason for using only the Financial
Times is that a single news source avoids double-counting, its number of emerging market stories
is not trending, and examination of a random sample showed this source to have largest fraction of
relevant stories. Out of a random sample of 100 Financial Times stories that satisfied the selection
criteria, 97 contained some information related to the strength of the emerging market or the value
of its assets. The reason for using emerging market rather than firm-level data is that selecting
stories related to a country’s economy is easier than selecting stories for a given firm. Which stories
at the industry and country level are relevant to that firm is less clear-cut.
Linking λ to News Stories
The monopolistic competition model of the information market can be used to bridge the gap
between the fraction of informed agents λ in the theory and the number of news stories (or simply
stories) in the data. When the demand for information about a market rises, more stories are
printed. This number of stories can be interpreted as varieties of the same information. Using the
monopolistic competition framework, the number of stories is formally tied to λ. Stories can also
be interpreted as conveying different information, in an extension of the model.
Varieties of the Same Information Assume that stories have the same properties as the
news types in the monopolistic competition model. Each story conveys the same information θt+1.
Besides conveying information, each story provides some direct utility cost or benefit. Each story
is a different type j and has a different utility cost for agent i, ψij ∼ unif[b, b¯]. Let b = b¯ − b.
Each story has the same fixed cost of production χ. Producers of stories compete by choosing
information price cj to maximize their profit.
Under these assumptions, appendix A.1 shows that the equilibrium number of stories will be
proportional to λ1/2.
q =
(
bλt
aχ
eaWI
)1/2
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Varieties of Different Information Another way to relate the number of Financial Times
stories to the model is to interpret each story as a noisy signal about the true future state θt+1. In
this setting, each agent might want multiple stories to increase the accuracy of their information.
This extended model is set up in Appendix B. The intuition for the mechanism is outlined here.
Suppose that each time a supplier incurs the cost of discovery, he draws a different noisy signal
of the state, a different story. Identical copies of each story can be made at zero marginal cost and
sold to other agents. Another new assumption is that the cost of information discovery falls in the
number of information types. If q stories are discovered, the cost of discovery is χ˜(q), χ˜′(q) < 0
and χ˜′′(q) > 0. The declining cost captures the idea that an organization producing lots of news
about a country has an infrastructure set up to collect this information, and will have an easier
time marginally increasing its information production.
News stories exhibit the same price complementarities and decreasing marginal value of infor-
mation as does λ, the fraction of informed investors. It is these competing forces that generate the
frenzies in the model. News stories are complements because the equilibrium price of a news story
falls when many are supplied. News stories are substitutes because they are correlated signals. In
expectation, each observed news story provides less additional information than the previous story.
When news is scarce, the decrease in the price of news is the dominant force; the net benefit of
the next news story is increasing. When news is abundant, information content declines; the net
benefit of additional stories falls. Because demand functions for λ and news stories have the same
form, a news stories measure behaves similarly to the fraction of informed investors λ in the original
model. A single demand for information λ does not exist in this model. Rather, there are identical
demands λq for each story in positive supply. As λq rises, so will the equilibrium number of stories.
4 A Numerical Example
The goal of the model simulation is to examine the qualitative features of the price time-series and
to demonstrate that the model is capable of generating excess volatility comparable to that in the
data.
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Calibration
The information market I will calibrate is model I: price competition in a perfectly contestable
market. The per-capita cost of information discovery χ is such that no-information and positive-
information equilibria exist. The mean and variance of risky asset supply E[x] and σx, determine
the price level and the amount of idiosyncratic noise in the price. They are chosen to be large
enough to create non-trivial uncertainty about fundamentals, but not to drown out other sources
of price fluctuation. Autocorrelation (ρ) of θ is equal to the weekly autocorrelation in the price
indices. Variance of payoff shocks σ² determines the risk of investment for informed traders and
the scale of the asset price. It is as large as the asset supply shocks. Absolute risk-aversion a is 2.5.
Finally, the variance of innovations to fundamentals ση is chosen to match the price level variance
in the data with the model.9
Results: Frenzies
Because information reduces the conditional risk of the asset payoff, it increases the asset’s price.
Therefore, changes in the amount of information sold to investors increases price volatility. Two
features of the model amplify this effect. First, information is demanded only when asset payoffs
and prices are high. Provision of information pushes already high prices up higher. Movements in
extreme price levels have large consequences for the unconditional price variance. Second, changes
in information provision are large. A switch from a no-information equilibrium to a positive infor-
mation equilibrium can increase the fraction of informed agents by 80% in a single period.
No-Information Model Information Model Emerging Market Data
Price Standard Deviation 0.29 0.39 0.43
Var(Price)
Var(Price|Low News) 1.0 1.8 1.3
Table 1: Standard deviations of simulated variables and log price indices for 23 emerging markets.
Low news is defined as a level of λ, or count of news stories that falls below its median. Moments computed on a country-by-
country basis and then averaged. Simulated price changes are log changes. 5000 simulations.
One measure of the magnitude of frenzies is the ratio of price variance from simulations of the
model with and without information markets: var(Pinfo)var(Pno info) = 1.5. Information markets increase
9The parameter values are: χ = 0.012, E[x] = 6, σ2x = 1.6, ση = 0.09, σ² = 0.1, ρ = 0.99, a = 2.5. The average
relative risk aversion is 6.
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the price volatility by 50%. This is consistent with Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro’s (1991) finding
that equity prices from 1872-1987 exhibit excess volatility of about 50%. Since the no-information-
market price is not observed in the data, a frenzies measure based on observables is needed to
compare the model with the data. Using the price in periods when news provision is low can proxy
for the no-information price in the model. In periods when λ = 0, the prices in the models with
and without information markets are the same. Table 1 displays the unconditional price variance
divided by the variance of price conditional on observing an information level below its median.
The low news price variance in the model is price variance in the 50% of periods when λ is lowest
(λ is always zero in these periods). In the data, the low news prices are observations where the
number of news stories is less than the median of all news observations. An alternative procedure
using the country median to distinguish low-news and high-news times produces a variance ratio
of 1.2. The comparison only suggests that the model’s effect can be large enough to be a potential
explanation for frenzies.
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Figure 2: Simulated asset prices in the no-information model (lower line) and information model
(upper line). Excess price volatility: var(Pinfo)var(Pno info) = 1.5
Figure 2 plots the price series generated by the model and a version of the model where no
information is ever provided. When the information model is in a no-information equilibrium, the
asset price is the same as if information markets didn’t exist; the two prices lie on top of each other.
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It is only when there is positive demand for information that the model’s prices deviate from the
no-information benchmark.
The model’s prices display recurrent over-reactions to changes in fundamentals. For example,
a 20% deviation of the no-information price from trend can cause a 60% movement in the price
with information. (See periods 75-80 in figure 2.) The reason is that the model breaks the link
between fundamentals and prices, precisely when the changes in fundamentals are large. These
large changes are most likely to move information demand. It is the shift in information demand
that amplifies the price change. The conditional correlation of price and fundamentals reveals
this effect. Figure ?? plots the probability of price and fundamental changes being in the same
percentile bin, conditional on the change in fundamentals. Small and medium-size price changes
are tightly linked to changes in fundamentals. Large price increases or decreases are not.
An issue that arises in examining the asset price series is the validity of comparing this sequence
of two-period asset prices to the price of multi-period assets in the data. The difference between
the assets’ payoffs is price risk. While the two-period asset payoff is exogenous, the multi-period
asset payoff depends on the future expected asset price. This payoff differential is especially large
near θ?, where an information regime shift and thus a large change in prices is likely. Replacing
the two-period asset with a multi-period asset should cause the price path around the cutoff point
where the information regime shift occurs to be smoother. Agents in a no-information state who
anticipate a likely media frenzy tomorrow will value the asset more highly because large capital
gains are likely. Agents in the high-information state who anticipate the imminent end of the media
frenzy will reduce their value of the asset to hedge the risk of a price fall. However, when the asset
payoff is either a high or low outlier, the chance of a regime shift is small and price risk is low. In
these states, the two-period and multi-period assets will produce similar prices.
To isolate the quantitative contribution of information price complementarity, we can compare
a model with a fixed information price to the media frenzies model. The fixed information price
model is similar to Grossman-Stiglitz, but uses the dynamic state process from this model to make
information abundant when asset prices are high. The only difference between these two models
is that the Grossman-Stiglitz version holds the price of information equal to the average price of
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information in the media frenzies model; the media frenzies information price varies endogenously.
Simulations (10,000 iterations) show that an endogenously varying information price causes the
asset price volatility to be 40% higher than in a fixed-information-price setting.
5 Herding in a Model with Multiple Markets
In a setting with multiple investment markets, complementarity in information acquisition causes
media herds. An abundance of media attention is focused on one, or a subset of markets. Infor-
mation on the herd market is cheap. No information is available on the other markets because any
investor who wanted to purchase a signal would have to pay the entire fixed cost. The markets
with information have a higher asset price because the conditional variance of their payoff is lower.
When expected payoffs in a high information market start to fall, other markets may become more
attractive media markets because their risk and payoff are higher. There will be a quick switch in
equilibria as demand for information shifts from one market to the other. The shift in information
provision causes a fall in one asset price and a rise in the other. The result is that identical markets
have different equilibrium prices, and that prices exhibit excess cross-sectional volatility, relative
to fundamentals.
The new assumption introduced in this section is a trade-off between purchasing information
about one market or another. This assumption is crucial because without any interaction between
information demands, each market would have an independent price process, as described by the
one-market model. The trade-off is enforced through a constraint on the number of signals each
agent can purchase. This assumption can be interpreted as a constraint on space in newspapers,
on information processing abilities (as in Sims 2001), or a budget constraint.
Preferences, technology and information structure are identical to those in section 1, except for
the following two modifications. First, there are M markets, indexed by m. Each market has an
independent payoff process.
umt+1 = θ
m
t+1 + ²
m
t+1
θmt+1 = (1− ρ)µ+ ρ ∗ θmt (1 + ηmt+1)
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Innovations are i.i.d. normal, across time and markets. For simplicity, assume the shocks have com-
mon variances σ2η, σ
2
² . As before, define σ
m
θt = ρθ
m
t ση. Second, there is an information transmission
constraint. Each agent can observe, at most, k signals.
One way to isolate the herding effect of the model is to examine markets that are ex-ante
identical and show that their price levels diverge. The following proposition shows that, when there
is enough information demand, information constraints force some markets to a zero-information
equilibrium and create a wedge between the asset prices in markets with media coverage and
markets without.
Proposition 6 : Herding
Suppose that m˜ markets have identical histories (θt+1, ²t, xt) and identical parameters and that
agents can purchase at most k signals. Let λ? = argmaxλB(λ). If λ? > k/m˜, then the price of
the risky asset is not identical across markets. The asset price is higher in the markets with higher
information provision λmt.
When most markets are performing poorly, and total information demand is low, the information
transmission constraint does not bind. In these periods, the equilibrium is identical to the one-
market equilibrium, where the net benefit of an additional signal purchased is zero: Bm(λm) = 0.
When risk and asset payoffs are high in many markets, the information transmission constraint
binds. Equilibrium information demand equates the net benefit of information purchased across all
markets that supply information. Agents purchase information only in markets that can offer the
equilibrium net benefit level bt. Information trade-offs occur when the net benefit of signals in one
market shifts up (either due to a reduction in the information cost or a rise in θ). This makes the
information purchasing constraint bind more tightly and increases the cutoff level bt. To maintain
the higher net benefit, the information quantities in other markets must fall. A market that is near
the peak of its net benefit curve λ? may be driven to a no-information equilibrium when another
market performs well, because no positive amount of information could result in a net benefit that
exceeded the cutoff level bt. Figure 3 illustrates this information crowd-out effect.
Because abundant information raises the price of an asset, information trade-offs result in asset-
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Figure 3: Information crowd-out. Higher demand for information in a third market (not in graph) raises the
net benefit cutoff level from b1 to b2. Information demand in market E falls from E1 to E2. Information demand in
market D falls to zero.
price trade-offs and higher cross-sectional price variance. An asset whose expected payoff θt and
volatility σθt are higher than other assets generates abundant media coverage. The information
raises the highest price further above the other prices. A pattern of media attention successively
raising one asset price above the rest can be seen in figure 4. In the calibrated model, the ratio of
the average cross-section price variance with information to variance without information is 1.5.
6 Evidence of Media Frenzies and Herds
Three relationships between news and asset prices are predicted by the model: Asset payoff volatility
feeds the demand for news; news increases asset price, and news increases price dispersion across
markets. (propositions 4, 5 and 6) All three are supported by the data. The positive relationship
between asset market volatility and news is predicted by both this model and Grossman-Stiglitz.
However, this model adds that volatility should be high when asset payoffs are also high. The data
supports the hypothesis that high volatility and high payoffs both cause information provision to
increase. Furthermore, the data provides strong evidence of a positive correlation between news and
asset price levels. The final and most surprising result is that the data displays positive covariance
of news and price dispersion. News increasing price dispersion is a distinguishing feature of this
model. This result supports the link between information complementarities and asset markets.
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Figure 4: Price of the risky asset in three markets where information trade-offs are present. The
two panels show the price level with and without information markets. The information market drives a wedge
between the markets covered in the media and the non-covered markets. The result is increased cross-sectional price
dispersion. The cross-sectional variance in price is 1.5 times higher in the market with information. This simulation
uses the same parameter values as the simulation in section 4. The number of signals an agent can purchase each
period is one and the total number of markets is three.
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Asset Price Volatility and News
Previous work in empirical finance (Roll 1988, Mitchell and Mulherin 1994) has viewed news as
an exogenous process that moves price. One of the contributions of this work, both empirical and
theoretical, is to show that news should be thought of as an endogenous variable that interacts
with asset markets. Proposition 4 shows that markets with higher asset payoff volatility σθt should
generate more news, holding their parameters constant.10 The reason is that higher payoff volatility
represents higher risk. More risk makes information more valuable and increases demand.
Dependent variable constant ( 1T
∑T
1 (log(Rmt)− log(R¯m))2)1/2
1
T
∑T
t=1 newsmt 14.19 2.45
(0.19) (0.39)
Table 2: News and payoff volatility by country. Cross-section results from regressing a market’s average number
of news stories on the standard deviation of its asset payoffs. All tables show standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2 shows that the mean number of news stories in a country is positively and significantly
correlated with the variance of the country’s asset payoffs. Since the estimation treats each country
as one observation, there are only 23 data points. Also, the estimation ignores cross-country
correlation in price and news shocks.11
The next step uses the full panel of data to estimate the relationship between payoff volatility
and information with seemingly unrelated regressions for each country. The model predicts that
an increase in log volatility, total volatility or payoff levels should cause information to become
more valuable. Table 3 shows that all three measures of volatility covary positively with news.
The coefficient on log payoff volatility predicts that a 50% change in payoffs (∆ log(R)2 = 0.25)
generates 15 extra stories, that week, in the Financial Times.
An issue that arises from this estimation is that both variables are highly persistent. Autocor-
relation of errors is a concern. Estimating a non-linear least squares equation that includes a lagged
estimation error to correct for autocorrelation produces a return volatility coefficient estimate of
38.4 with a standard error of 4.21.
10In fact, an increase in any parameter that would be market-specific (not a preference parameter for investors that
would apply equally to all markets) and would increase price volatility would also increase information demand.
11The average price correlation between country pairs is 0.35, and the average correlation in news stories in 0.26.
The average correlation between country pairs is 0.28 for log changes in price, and 0.13 for log changes in news.
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Dependent Independent Regression with dividend
variable variable coefficient instruments
newsmt log payoff 58.40 196.81
volatility (12.08) (11.44)
newsmt payoff 1.93 8.22
volatility (∗10−4) (0.23) (1.24)
newsmt payoff (∗10−3) 3.26 6.44
(0.27) (0.63)
Table 3: News and payoff volatility over time. Panel estimation results from regressing number of news stories
on asset payoff (R) volatility and country fixed-effects. Price indices are divided by their country mean. Seemingly unrelated
regression estimation allows for contemporaneous correlation across countries and heteroscedasticity. Instrumental variables
are the news volatility variable, dividends, in levels, changes and squared changes, and 8 lags of the volatility variable. (23
countries, 12,194 obs.)
While these covariances provide support for the model, they do not speak to the causal relation-
ship between asset volatility and news. For a causal relationship to be established, instruments that
are exogenous with respect to news are needed. Payoff volatility is instrumented with dividends,
dividend changes, dividend volatility, and 8 lags of price volatility (table 3, column 2).12 Dividends
are valid instruments because they are strongly related to payoffs (R2 = 0.65), and are not affected
by news provision. News affects asset markets by reducing the conditional variance of expectations
about current or future conditions. Because dividends are not expectations-driven, but are largely
pre-determined outcomes of previous decisions about inputs, they are independent of news.
One might argue that dividends respond to changes in future expected cash flows, and therefore
to news about future economic conditions. However, changes in fundamentals that would affect cash
flows are exactly what dividend changes are intended to capture. Bad news might make dividends
fall. The fact that the bad news is printed in the newspaper does not provide information to
managers that would decrease dividends further. Dividends are good instruments not because they
are unaffected by news content, but because they are not dependent on news provision.
The reason volatility increases the demand for news is that the increase in risk makes information
more valuable. As a robustness check, I redo each estimation, including information volatility as a
control variable. (appendix C). The results are quantitatively similar.
One of the goals of this exercise was to show that news is being affected by asset markets.
While the correlation results cannot speak to causality, the instrumental variables approach does
12Results are qualitatively unchanged if lags are removed as instruments.
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suggest a causal relationship. To make this point more directly, I test the null hypothesis that
news is exogenous in the time series with respect to asset payoff volatility. Table 4 shows that this
hypothesis is strongly rejected.
Null Hypothesis F-stat P-value
News is exogenous with respect to payoff volatility 4.04 5 ∗ 10−11
Table 4: Granger test of news exogeneity with respect to asset payoff volatility. Test includes 25 lags
of each variable.
News and Asset Price Levels
When countries appear in the news more often, they should have higher asset prices, on average,
because the information conveyed in the news stories decreases the investment risk. The next step
uses the full panel to estimate the relationship between news and price. Because price indices are
not comparable across countries, a country fixed effect is included. The result (in table 5) suggests
that a one standard deviation increase in news stories (8.2 stories) coincides with a $2.30 increase
in the country’s asset price index, a 1% increase over the average price level.
Dependent variable newsmt
Pmt 0.28
(0.03)
Pmt/dmt 0.18
(0.02)
Table 5: News and Price Level. Time-series results from regressing price, or price-dividend ratio, on the number of
news stories and country fixed-effects. Seemingly unrelated regression estimation allows for contemporaneous correlation across
countries and heteroscedasticity. (12,194 observations)
Again, the issue of autocorrelated errors, or even possibly unit root errors arises. Here, the
theory provides a simple solution. When news coverage increases, prices should rise, holding payoffs
constant. This implies an increase in the price-dividend ratio (P/D). Using P/D as the dependent
variable, instead of price, produces a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.88. This is a rejection of serially
correlated errors. The strong positive relationship between news and P/D reconfirms the theory’s
prediction.
The question of an external event increasing news and price for reasons outside the model is
again an important one. Unfortunately, there is no valid instrument for news. To instrument for
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news, one would want a variable that affected news, but not asset prices. The theory is explicitly
about asset payoff relevant news. This news is, by definition, not independent of the asset price.
Two factors mitigate this concern. First, events that create news are not inherently good or
bad. Large events in the news are likely to affect asset prices, but are not more likely to increase
than to decrease the asset’s expected value. The only systematic effect of news on price might be
to reduce prices by increasing volatility and risk. This relationship would negatively bias the news
coefficient. It could not explain the positive relationship between news and price. Furthermore,
appendix C shows that controlling for price or payoff volatility does not significantly change the
coefficient estimates.
Simultaneous Equation Estimation
Because exogenous events could affect price and news through mechanisms outside the model, the
last step estimates price and news as a system of equations. The estimation method, three stage
least squares, accommodates error correlation across the two equations and across price and news
in every country. This method also allows the inclusion of dividends as instruments for payoff
volatility. Table 6 features positive coefficients for news on price and for volatility on news, as
predicted by the theory.
News on Price newsmt
Dependent variable 1.35
Pmt (0.03)
Payoff Volatility on News (∆ log(Rmt))2
Dependent variable: 172.75
newsmt (18.06)
Table 6: Panel estimation results from simultaneously regressing price on the number of news
stories, and news on payoff volatility. Payoff volatility is instrumented with contemporaneous and
1-period lagged dividend levels and dividend volatility, and one lag of payoff volatility. All equations
include country fixed effects. Three stage least squares estimation allows for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation
across equations and countries. (12,194 observations for each equation)
Allowing cross-equation error correlation increases the coefficient of news on price almost five-
fold. This increase results from the negative correlation of estimation residuals between the price
and news equations. Exogenous positive shocks to news make exogenous negative shocks to price
more likely. Residual correlations vary by country, ranging from −0.64 to 0.11, with an average of
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−0.17. Their origin is the presence of news as an independent variable in the first equation and a
dependent variable in the second. The consequence of failing to account for this correlation is that
increases in news, because they are often correlated with decreases in prices, are estimated to have
a less positive price effect. By neglecting to account for the way in which asset markets generate
demand for news, previous work may have underestimated the positive relationship between news
and price.
To understand the potential magnitude of the news effect on asset price, consider the following
example. Between 1989 and 1992, the average number of Financial Times news stories per week
on Thailand was 3.8, and the average price index was 164. In 1996-97, the average number of news
stories was 19.8, and the average price index was 243. An increase of 16 news stories per week
corresponds to a 22-point increase in the price index. If the correlations reported in table 6 are
due to forces in the model, then 28% of the increase in Thai asset prices was due to news and the
remaining 72% to changes in fundamentals.
Evidence of Herding
According to the theory, news can drive a wedge between prices in similar asset markets. When
news provision is low, the information transmission constraint does not bind and markets have
no effect on each other. It is only when total information demand is high that conditions for
information crowd-out and herds arise. Therefore, price dispersion and news should be positively
correlated.
To test this hypothesis, I regress the dispersion of prices each week on the week’s average number
of news stories per emerging market. The results (in table 7) support the theory’s prediction. The
results are for the unbalanced panel. Restricting the data to the period in which all countries have
price data (February 1997 - June 2002, 282 observations) results in a smaller coefficient on news
(2.82) that is still statistically significant at the 99% level.
While the previous results established that information markets and asset markets are closely
connected, this is the result that most clearly distinguishes this theory from other information-based
theories of asset price fluctuations. Without complementarity in information markets, information
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Dependent variable constant 1M
∑M
m=1 newsmt
( 1M
∑M
m=1(Pmt − P¯t)2)1/2 84.35 8.41
(7.78) (0.49)
Table 7: Test of the herding hypothesis: Price dispersion increases with news. Price dispersion is a
time series of the standard deviation of prices across the 23 emerging markets. News is the total number of news stories for all
emerging markets per week. Price dispersion increases when news is abundant. (704 observations)
would be evenly distributed across all markets and would not increase price dispersion. Only an
information-based complementarity would cause asset market dispersion to fluctuate with news.
7 Conclusion
Media frenzies are an abundance of information provided to investors about an asset or class of
assets by a competitive market for information. The non-rival nature of information and the
resulting price complementarity naturally create the conditions for information herds and frenzies
to arise. Media frenzies raise asset prices by reducing the uncertainty about the asset’s payoff.
In a single market, media frenzies increase prices and price volatility in what appears to be an
asset-buying frenzy. In multiple markets with trade-offs in information demand, a media frenzy in
one market raises the market price and increases the cross-sectional price variance. The resulting
price path looks like herds of investors stampeding from one market to the next.
Using price complementarities in information to generate asset market frenzies avoids some of
the problems of earlier models. It avoids the criticism levied against the herding models that their
discrete choice space is needed (Lee 1993, Vives 1993) and that market clearing prices interfere with
the effect (Avery and Zemsky, 1998). This bubble-like outcome does not rely on agents who are not
subject to transversality conditions (as in Blanchard and Watson, 1982), or are otherwise not fully
rational. Deviations from fundamentals reflect only the reduced investment risk that accompanies
close media scrutiny.
Complementarity of information acquisition is not limited to settings where information is
purchased in a competitive market. The idea can be extended to more informal settings as well.
Consider the following example of an individual learning in the presence of network externalities.
Suppose that all information is freely available. However, an investor must decide whether or not to
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exert effort to find news which reveals asset-payoff-relevant information. Other people the investor
meets can alert him to events and news of interest, reducing the required search effort to discover
the related information. Such a setting could produce an information complementarity where other
people knowing information makes acquiring that same information more attractive.
Introducing cross-market information interactions into the theory could generate contagion:
high correlation in countries’ prices when prices are low and information is scarce. Complemen-
tarity magnifies price volatility as markets reinforced each others’ booms and crashes. Information
substitutability, arising from correlation in market fundamentals, generates price correlation that
is strongest in crises. If market x’s signal is informative about market y, then beliefs about y react
to news about x. The reaction will be strongest when information is scarce. Information is scarce
when expected payoffs and price are low. Countries where the market for information is thin may
be particularly susceptible to contagion because high variance prior beliefs allow small pieces of
new information to move beliefs, and therefore prices, substantially.
Media markets could also provide insight into the home bias puzzle. In a coordination model
with potential multiple equilibria, a natural question is whether focal points exist. Local companies
may provide a natural focal point for news providers, prone to herding. An abundance of low-cost
information available to local residents will increase their demand for the asset.
Modelling media coverage also provides a stronger microeconomic foundation for models that
use time-varying information flows to generate asymmetry (Veldkamp, 2002, Van Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp, 2002). Information, such as news stories, that becomes abundant when the market
is strong generates sudden crashes and gradual booms. When fundamentals are strong and asset
prices are high, media frenzies arise and agents become well-informed. This model provides a
market mechanism that ties information flow to asset prices in the way needed to generate this
asymmetry.
Media frenzies rely crucially on the high fixed cost and low marginal cost of information pro-
duction. As a result, the theory predicts that innovations such as the internet that reduce the
marginal cost of information provision will make media-driven frenzies increasingly common. This
prediction seems roughly in line with recent history and offers a warning about the future volatility
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of asset markets.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
When information demand is positive, equilibrium demand is a λ such that the net benefit of information purchase is
zero. Let payoff variance be denoted σθt ≡ ρθtση. Manipulating the net benefit equation 6 and setting the benefit of
information (left side of equation 7) equal to its cost in utility units (right side of 7) yields the equilibrium information
demand:13
σ2x(aσ²/λt)
2
1 + (σ2x/σ2θt)(aσ
2
²/λt)2
= e2a(c(λt)+ψ˜) − 1 (7)
Model I: Equilibrium price equals average cost (c = χ/λ)
Proof: Suppose the equilibrium information price was above average cost. Then, an alternate supplier could enter
the market with a slightly lower price, and make a profit. If a supplier set price below marginal cost, they would
make a loss. This strategy would be dominated by no information provision. If there are two or more suppliers, then
either price is above marginal cost, which can’t be an equilibrium by the first argument, or both firms price at (or
below) marginal cost, split the market, and make a loss, which is dominated by exit.
Model II: Cournot Model
Given a quantity of information supplied to the market, the asset price and demand will be identical to the Bertrand
case. What changes in a Cournot model is the quantity of information provided. To solve for that quantity, begin
by showing that one firm always wants to maintain a monopoly position in the information market, rather than
accommodate an entrant. Suppose a firm produced a quantity of information Q1, measured in signals per capital,
such that a second producer could produce a quantity Q2 for a profit pi(Q2) ≥ 0. Then, the incumbent firm could
do strictly better by producing an amount Q1 +Q2, and capturing the additional profit pi(Q2) + χ > 0. The χ term
enters because the firm does not have to bear the production fixed cost twice.
Now, the problem can be formulated as a constrained maximization where the incumbent maximizes profit,
subject to the constraint that he must deter entry. Let P denote the price of information, Q1 the incumbent’s
quantity of signals per capita and Q2 the challenger’s.
max
Q1
P (Q1) ∗Q1
13For a derivation of this expression, see appendix B of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). This equilibrium condition
ignores integer constraints on the number of agents.
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s.t. max
Q2
P (Q1 +Q2) ∗Q2 ≤ χ
Rearranging equation 7 yields a price-quantity relationship for information demand:
P (Q) = − 1
2a
ln
(
Q2 +M
Q2 +M +MN
)
(8)
where M = (σx/σθ)
2(aσ2² )
2 and N = (σθ/σ²)
2.
The negative relationship between price and quantity comes from the demand equation (8). The negative first
derivative of the demand equation is sufficient to prove the proposition.
Model III: Monopolistic Competition
Following Perloff and Salop (1985), free-entry in the information market implies that equilibrium information price
c(λt), times the number of agents who buy information Nλt, times the probability an agent most prefers information
of type j, Hj , must be equal to the fixed cost of entry.
c(λt)λtHj = χ
As in Perloff and Salop, I ignore the integer constraints on the number of news types. In equilibrium, each type
j attracts an equal share of the market. Let nJ be the number of types supplied in equilibrium.
c(λt)λt = χnJ
The first-order condition of the news supplier’s profit maximization problem yields p = b
nJ
. Combining this with
the free-entry conditions, we get equilibrium price and number of firms.
nJ = [
bλt
χ
]1/2
p = [
bχ
λt
]1/2
The equilibrium price is decreasing in λt. Thus, the more people buy news, the lower the price of news will be.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2: Information Complementarity
B(λ; θt) is the net benefit of buying a signal. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, appendix B) show that equation 1 can be
expressed as
B(λ; θt) =
[
1 +
σ2x ∗ (aσ²/λt)2
1 + σ2x/σ2θt ∗ (aσ2²/λt)2
]1/2
− e2a(c(λt)+ψ˜). (9)
To begin, assume that ψ˜ = 0 (as in Bertrand or Cournot markets). Differentiation with respect to λ yields
∂B(λ; θt)
∂λ
= −λa2σ2xσ2² [λ
2 + a2σ2xσ
2
² (1 + σ
2
²/σ
2
θ)]
−1/2
[λ2 + σ2x/σ2θ(aσ
2
² )2]3/2
− ac′(λ)eac(λ)
The first term is zero when λ = 0 and is negative for all λ > 0. This is because the benefit of information declines
as the price level becomes more informative. According to proposition 1, c′(λ) < 0. Thus, the second term is strictly
positive for all λ ≥ 0. Since ∂B(λ;θt)
∂λ
is continuous in λ > 0, and is strictly positive in the neighborhood of zero, the
proposition follows.
When ψ˜ 6= 0, there is a second positive externality of an increase in demand for news: increased diversity of
available news types. Note that nJ in proposition 1 proof, is increasing in λ. The expected lowest individual-specific
cost of information for a given agent i is
E[ψ¯] =
b
nJ + 1
.
As the number of news types nJ increases, E[ψ¯] decreases. Every agent must be made weakly better off with more
available news types to choose from. Therefore, the second term in the derivative of the net benefit equation with
news types is
−a(c′(λ) + ∂ψ˜/∂λ)e2a(c(λt)+ψ˜)
which is still strictly increasing near zero.
32
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3: Information Equilibrium Transition Rule
Step 1: If B(λ) > 0 holds for any λ > 0, then there exists an equilibrium λe > 0.
A level of information demand, λes is an equilibrium if the people who buy information weakly prefer to do so
(B(λe) ≥ 0) and, either λe = 1, or an uninformed person weakly prefers staying uninformed (B(λe + ²) ≤ 0, ² > 0).
Suppose that there is some λ such that B(λ) > 0 but no equilibrium exists. If λ is not an equilibrium, then
it must be that B(λ + ²) > 0. By induction, if B(λ + ²˜) is not an equilibrium, for any ²˜ > 0 then it must be that
B(1) > 0. But, then λ = 1 is an equilibrium, which is a contradiction. Step 2: A positive information equilibrium
exists iff {
σ2θt+1 + σ
2
² + σ
2
θt+1
[
1 +
(
aσ²σx
λtσθt+1
)2]−1}1/2
≥ exp[a(c(λt) + ψ˜)]σ² for some λt ² (0, 1). (10)
Using step 1 and the Grossman Stiglitz result (p.405) that Var[u|Pλ] = σ2θ + σ2² − σ
2
θ
1+(aσ2²/(λσθ))
2σ2x
. Inequality
(10) follows. Step 3: There exists a θ? such that for all θ ≥ θ?, (10) holds.
Only two terms in (10) vary: λ and σθ. Let θ
? be the lowest θ > 0 such that (10) holds for some λ. Let the λ
that satisfies (10) at θ? be λe.
Partial differentiation shows that the left side of (10) is increasing in σθ. Furthermore, σθ is increasing in θ, when
θ > 0. Thus, for any θ ≥ θ?, (10) holds at λ = λe > 0. Step 4: For θt > θ?, an equilibrium where λt = 0 does not
exist.
Suppose λt = 0 was an equilibrium. Then, some agent could decide to discover information at a per-capita cost
χ and sell it at a price χ/λe + ². Since θt > θ
?, the net benefit curve lies strictly above zero at λe − ² and the
information producer can capture positive surplus by raising price. Therefore, zero information production cannot
be an equilibrium strategy for all agents. Step 5: When θt ≤ θ?, the equilibrium is λt = 0.
If (10) does not hold for any λ > 0, then there cannot be an equilibrium where λe > 0. If there were, then all
agents who purchase information would be strictly better off not purchasing it.
A no-information equilibrium exists because neither purchasers nor suppliers want to deviate from their equilib-
rium strategies. No purchaser would purchase information. (10) rules this out. No supplier would want to supply
information because at any price greater than average cost, the demand for the information would be zero.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4: Payoff Volatility Increases Information
Recall that σθt is linear in θt, so that ∀θt > 0, σθt in increasing in θt. From proposition 4, we know that for θt < θ?,
λt = 0. For θt ≥ θ?, λt > 0. In a positive information equilibrium, information demand is determined implicitly by
equation 7. Applying the implicit function theorem to B(λ) = 0 (equation 9) in a region where B′(λ) ≥ 0, which is
a necessary condition for a stable positive-information equilibrium, yields ∂λt/∂σθt > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5: Information Increases Asset Price
Begin by taking the expectations of asset demand, conditional on θt. For agents who purchase information, expected
demand is
E[θt+1|θt]− rE[P |θt]
aσ²
For agents who do not purchase information in the positive information equilibrium,
E[E[θt+1|Pt, θt]|θt]− rE[P |θt]
aV ar[ut+1|Pt]
=
E[θt+1|θt]− rE[P |θt]
aV ar[ut+1|Pt]
by iterated expectations. Thus, expected total demand in the information equilibrium is
λ
E[θt+1|θt]− rE[P |θt]
aσ2²
+ (1− λ)E[θt+1|θt]− rE[P |θt]
aV ar[ut+1|Pt] .
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Note that the variance term V ar[ut+1|Pt] is not stochastic, conditional on θt because it only depends on parameters
that can be deduced from θt. In the no-information equilibrium, let P
U denote the ’uninformed’ asset price. Then,
expected demand is:
E[θt+1|θt]− rE[PU |θt]
aσ2² + σ2θ
.
Since demand must be equal to xt in both equilibria, the two expressions for demand must equal each other.
λ
E[θt+1|θt]− rE[P |θt]
aσ2²
+ (1− λ)E[θt+1|θt]− rE[P |θt]
aV ar[ut+1|Pt] =
E[θt+1|θt]− rE[PU |θt]
aσ2² + σ2θ
The fact that information decreases the variance of the asset payoff implies that σ2² + σ
2
θ > V ar[ut+1|Pt] > σ2² . This
implies that E[P |θt] > E[PU |θt].
The fact that corr(Pt, ut+1|θt) is increasing in λ means that Var[ut+1|Pt] is decreasing in λ. Following the same
steps as above, one can show that if λ1 > λ2, then E[P1|θt] > E[P2|θt].
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6: Herding
Suppose that m˜ markets have identical histories (θt+1, ²t, xt) and identical parameters and that agents can purchase
at most k signals. Let λ? = argmaxλB(λ). If λ
? > k/m˜, then the price of the risky asset will not be identical across
markets. It will be higher in the market with higher information demand λmt.
Suppose not. Suppose that the price of the risky asset is identical in all m˜ markets. From proposition 5 we
know that information increases the asset price. So for each market to have the same asset price, given the same
histories, they must have the same amount of information as well. Suppose λ = 0 in all markets. For this to be an
equilibrium, is must be that argmaxλB(λ) = 0. But then λ
? = 0 < k/m˜, which contradicts one of the conditions of
the proposition. Therefore, all markets have the same positive amount of information λm. The information capacity
constraint says that the maximum fraction of informed agents in each market would be λm = k/m˜ < λ
?.
Since each market has a λm < λ
?, the net benefit of information in each market is increasing in λm. This means
an agent in one market, who gets a net benefit of B(λm) from his information, has an incentive to purchase a signal
in another market to get a net benefit of B(λm + ²) > B(λm). Therefore, this cannot be an equilibrium.
The fact that the price will be higher in the market with the higher λm follows directly from proposition 5.
B An Extended Model with News Stories
This section describes a model of news supply where news stories are varieties of different information. The equilibrium
number of stories nJ increases with the fraction of informed agents λ in the original model.
Investors, preferences, asset markets, and asset payoffs are as described in section 1. Only information markets
differ. For a cost χ˜(nJ), each information supplier j discovers a different story:
qjt = θt+1 + γjt γjt ∼ N(0, σ2γ)
and sells stories – identical copies of qjt – at an endogenous price. χ˜
′(nJ) > 0. Any agent can become an supplier at
any time. Suppliers are price-setting monopolistic competitors. Agents can buy multiple stories.
Consider an agent who has information Fit, either purchased or inferred from the price level that leads her
to believe the following: E[ut+1|Fit] = θˆ and V ar[ut+1|Fit] = σ˜J . Suppose the agent buys an additional story j.
When no other agents buy j (λj = 0), the price level is uninformative about qj . Define σ˜θj to be the reduction
in payoff variance after observing q when λq = 0. Define σ˜²j to be the payoff variance conditional on Fit and qj .
σ˜2²j = V ar[ut+1|Fit, n] = σ˜2J − σ˜2θj . Holding these conditional variances fixed, the decision of whether to buy story j
takes the same form as that in the original model. The net benefit of buying j when Nλj investors also buy j is
B˜(λj , nJ) =
σ2x(aσ˜²j/λjt)
2
1 + (σ2x/σ˜2θj)(aσ˜
2
²j/λjt)
2
− e2aχ˜(nJ )/λjt) + 1. (11)
What changes when multiple noisy signals – stories – are introduced is that σ˜θj changes for each story. Whenever
a new story is supplied to the market, it is partially revealed through the equilibrium price level. Both agents who
purchase the story, and those who don’t, have a lower variance estimate of the payoff.
The net benefit of purchasing the next story increases, due to price complementarity, and then decreases as the
price becomes more informative. The parallel between the net benefit for the number of stories and λ in the original
model cause their equilibrium quantities to move together.
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The force that causes the net benefit of the next story to decrease is more substitutable information. As the
number of stories grows, each new story reduces payoff variance less: σ˜θj falls. The reason is that in the Bayesian
updating formula, a new signal (the story) with the same variance is given less weight when the variance of the
prior is less. For example, if the variance of a normally distributed prior is σ˜J and the variance of the signal
is σγ , then the variance of the posterior is σ˜Jσγ/(σ˜J + σγ). The variance reduction from observing the story is
σ˜θj = σ˜J(1 − σγ/(σ˜J + σγ)), which is increasing in σJ . So, the larger the prior variance σJ , the larger the variance
reduction σ˜θj . Because each new story reduces the variance of beliefs that will be the prior beliefs on observing the
next story, each new story reduces σ˜θj .
The force that causes the net benefit of stories to rise is price complementarity. Complementarity in stories
arises because each story lowers the fixed cost of discovering all stories. Since the average cost of a story falls, the
equilibrium price of stories falls too. This follows from the proof of a declining price in a monopolistic competition
model (appendix A.1). Given that nJ stories will be produced, consumers view these stories as ex-ante identical.
In equilibrium, demand for each story produced λj must be the same for all stories. Appendix A.1 shows that the
number of varieties offered my competitive monopolists increases in the demand for each variety. This tells us that
nJ increases in λj . To the extent that λj in this setting is the equivalent of λ in the model with one news story, then
the number of stories is increasing with λ.
C Data Appendix
C.1 News and Asset Data: Descriptive Statistics
News counts are the number of stories in the Financial Times, in a given week, with the country name in the
title or lead paragraph of the article. For every country, this series begins in 1/1989 and continues until 6/2002
(703 observations per country). Asset price index is the S&P /IFCI investible index from their Emerging Markets
Database. Price and payoff (total return) data are an unbalanced panel. Many of the markets were not opened to
foreign investment until after 1989. The date at which price and payoff indices become available for a country are
listed as the start date in table 8. Price and payoff indices are normalized to 100 at the country start date.
Country Number of News Stories Asset Price Index
mean min max stdev Start Date mean stdev
Argentina 12.5 0 71 8.5 January 1989 695.8 321.4
Brazil 19.1 0 118 10.8 January 1989 278.5 143.9
Chile 6.7 0 32 4.4 January 1989 500.0 203.8
China 41.4 5 114 18.0 September 1993 61.3 25.7
Czech Republic 8.7 0 47 5.3 April 1996 55.0 10.1
Egypt 6.8 0 47 4.8 February 1997 62.9 25.3
Greece 11.8 0 38 5.9 January 1989 378.4 216.8
Hungary 9.7 0 33 4.8 January 1994 225.1 67.0
India 22.7 0 85 10.1 November 1992 90.7 20.9
Indonesia 12.5 0 87 10.4 September 1990 67.8 39.2
Israel 17.4 4 78 8.6 August 1997 138.9 26.1
Malaysia 12.0 0 50 7.5 January 1989 174.7 82.3
Mexico 19.0 0 71 10.8 January 1989 587.6 219.4
Morocco 2.0 0 16 2.0 February 1997 135.4 24.5
Peru 3.9 0 30 3.1 September 1993 169.8 39.2
Philippines 8.6 0 44 5.8 January 1989 159.7 84.1
Poland 13.7 1 54 6.6 January 1994 601.3 145.2
Russia 46.0 12 193 17.7 February 1997 87.4 41.9
South Africa 25.4 2 71 11.0 January 1994 188.2 39.5
South Korea 18.4 0 82 11.6 January 1992 87.7 31.9
Taiwan 10.7 0 33 6.4 January 1991 126.0 31.6
Thailand 10.9 0 54 8.3 January 1989 184.3 123.7
Turkey 11.0 0 48 6.1 August 1989 208.5 116.3
All countries 15.2 0 193 8.2 255.0 237.2
Table 8: Descriptive statistics for data set.
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C.2 Robustness Checks
Payoff Volatility and News
One of the forces in the model that could create a correlation between payoff volatility and news is news volatility.
The reason that the model generates excess volatility is not because the news level is high, but because occasionally
the news equilibrium changes, and news volatility is high. To the extent that news level and news volatility are
correlated, news volatility could explain the previous regression coefficients, without news being a result of payoff
volatility. This section re-runs these regressions, controlling for news volatility to verify that a relationship between
payoff volatility and the news level still exists. (Table 9)
Dependent variable: constant stdm(log(Rmt)) stdm(log(newsmt))
1
T
∑T
t=1
newsmt 46.63 15.45 -62.59
(0.30) (0.31) (0.52)
Table 9: Cross-section results from regressing a market’s average number of news stories on its asset payoff volatil-
ity. Controlling for news variance isolates the relationship between price volatility and news. Standard errors in
parentheses.
The reason payoff volatility increases the demand for news is that the increase in risk makes information more
valuable. This holds even after controlling for news volatility. This robustness check works for the panel estimation
with and without instruments as well. (Table 10)
Dependent variable: newsmt (log(Rmt)− log(Rm(t−1)))2 (log(newsmt)− log(newsm(t−1)))2
News and payoff 58.64 −0.06
volatility over time (4.89) (0.07)
Effect of payoff vol. 157.92 −0.03
on news with IV (15.72) (0.07)
Table 10: Panel estimation results from regressing number of news stories on asset price (P) or payoff (R) volatility
and country fixed-effects. Price indices are divided by their country mean. Seemingly unrelated regression estimation
allows for contemporaneous correlation across countries and heteroscedasticity. Controlling for news variance isolates
the effect of volatility on news. Instrumental variables are the news volatility variable, dividends, in levels, changes
and squared changes, and 8 lags of the volatility variable.
News Increases Price
Proposition 5 shows that news increases price by reducing the conditional risk of investment. However, the model
also predicts that the price level can effect news if it is correlated with price volatility, and therefore payoff volatility
in the data. This is the only other relationship between the price level and news identified by the model. To check if
the correlation between price and news is robust to price and payoff volatility, I re-estimate including price volatility
as a control variable. This inclusion has a negligible effect on the parameter estimates. (Tables 11 and 12)
Dependent variable: constant 1
M
∑M
m=1
newsmt
1
M
∑M
m=1
(log(Rmt)− log(Rm(t−1)))2
1
M
∑M
m=1
Pmt 213.56 4.15 -580.69
(7.65) (0.37) (73.99)
Table 11: Cross-section average news and price over time, controlling for payoff volatility. Prices increase when news
is abundant. Price is the average price index for all countries in the sample, each week. News is the average number of news
stories for all emerging markets per week. OLS estimation. White standard errors in parentheses. (704 observations)
Simultaneous Equation Estimation
The final exercise re-estimate the simultaneous equations system controlling for news variance in the news equation
and payoff variance in the price equation. Results in table 13 are very close to those reported in section 6.
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Dependent variable: newsmt ((Pmt − Pm(t−1))/P¯m)2
Pmt 0.24 526.8
(0.04) (52.5)
Dependent variable: newsmt (log(Rmt)− log(Rm(t−1)))2
Pmt 0.30 −190.9
(0.04) (33.8)
Table 12: Panel results from regressing price, on the number of news stories, price or payoff volatility, and country
fixed-effects. Controlling for volatility isolates the effect of news on the price level. Seemingly unrelated regression
estimation allows for contemporaneous correlation across countries and heteroscedasticity. (12,194 observations)
Dependent variable: Pmt newsmt (log(Rmt)− log(Rm(t−1)))2
Effect of News on Price 2.04 −350.6
(0.02) (28.4)
Dependent variable: newsmt (log(Rmt)− log(Rm(t−1)))2 (log(newsmt)− log(newsm(t−1)))2
Effect of payoff 58.10 3.23
volatility on news (4.37) (0.22)
Table 13: Panel estimation results from simultaneously regressing price on the number of news stories, controlling
for payoff volatility, and news on payoff volatility, controlling for news volatility. All equations include country fixed
effects. Seemingly unrelated regression estimation allows for heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation
across equations and countries. (12,194 observations for each equation)
C.3 Unit Root Tests
Stationarity of the data is a cause for concern. Price data is usually trending and news stories may well be proliferating.
This section shows that these concerns are not warranted in this data set.
The news data is the number of stories published per week in one news source: the Financial Times. Figure 5
plots the average number of news stories per emerging market. The number of stories in 2002 is approximately the
same and in 1994, but is higher than in the early 90’s. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test of each country’s news series
rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root, at the 1% significance level, for every country but one – Korea. A unit root
for Korean news can be rejected at the 5% level.
The price data is an emerging market equity price index. The units for all countries indices are U.S. dollars.
The solid line in figure 5, representing the average price index level in all emerging markets, has no obvious trend.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of individual countries’ price series reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5%
level for one country, and at the 10% level for 5 countries. However, a more powerful test would use all countries’
data in a joint stationarity test.
One way to jointly test countries’ price data for stationarity is to estimate
∆Pmt =
q∑
i=1
φi∆Pm(t−i) + α+ ρPm(t−1) + ²mt
and test the null hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 α = 0. OLS estimation with a t-test rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level.
It rejects the simple null ρ = 0 at the 1% level as well. Estimating by SUR to allow for correlated country shocks and
heteroscedasticity, yields the same results. The same system is estimated, allowing φ and α to be country-specific, as
in Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). A likelihood ratio test rejects both H0 : ρ = 0 α = 0 and H˜0 : ρ = 0 at the 1% level.
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Figure 5: Average price index (solid line), number of news stories (dots), and payoff volatility (dashed line).Monthly
data reported. All series are normalized by their respective country means before they are averaged across all emerging markets.
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